Taking \u3ci\u3eStrickland\u3c/i\u3e Claims Seriously by Smith, Stephen F.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 93
Issue 2 Symposium: Criminal Appeals: Past, Present,
and Future
Article 8
Taking StricklandClaims Seriously
Stephen F. Smith
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 515 (2009).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol93/iss2/8
 TAKING STRICKLAND CLAIMS SERIOUSLY 
STEPHEN F. SMITH* 
Every criminal defendant is promised the right to the effective assistance of counsel.  Whether at 
trial or on first appeal of right, due process is violated when attorney negligence undermines the 
fairness and reliability of judicial proceedings.  That, at least, is the black-letter law articulated in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  In practice, however, the right to effective 
representation has meant surprisingly little over the last two decades.  Under the standards that 
emerged from Strickland, scores of defendants have received prison or death sentences by virtue of 
serious unprofessional errors committed by their attorneys. 
This Essay canvasses a line of recent Supreme Court cases that have breathed new life into 
Strickland as a meaningful guarantee of effective defense representation.  These cases—all of which 
involved sentences of death—pointedly reject the understanding of Strickland that made it 
exceedingly difficult to prevail on ineffective-assistance claims.  Although the new line of Strickland 
cases were undoubtedly motivated by concerns about the proper administration of the death penalty, 
the more rigorous understanding of Strickland should not be limited to capital cases.  Whether or not 
the death penalty is at stake, appellate courts should be vigilant in policing the effectiveness of 
defense attorneys so that the determinative factor in criminal proceedings will be the strength of the 
government’s case on the merits, not the weakness of the defense put forth by the lawyers for the 
defendants. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Important as it is in our adversarial system of justice, the right of criminal 
defendants to be represented by counsel rests on a contradiction.  On the one 
hand, the right to counsel is deemed an essential component of due process—
essential because a judicial system that denies suspects access to counsel for 
their defense is likely to produce inaccurate and unreliable outcomes.
1
  
Without lawyers, defendants, innocent and guilty alike, typically will have 
little hope of presenting credible defenses or successfully asserting their legal 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. 
1. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–44 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel against the states).  In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963), 
the Supreme Court ruled that suspects also have the right to counsel in their first appeals of right (as 
distinct from discretionary and postconviction review proceedings).  Douglas rested on due process 
as well as equal protection concerns.  See id. at 356–58.  The due process roots of the right to counsel 
can be traced back to at least Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932), in which the Court ruled 
that, even apart from the Sixth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause itself 
requires the appointment of counsel in certain situations.  
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rights.
2
  Mere access to counsel, however, is not enough to avert the danger of 
inaccurate, unreliable results.  The attorneys who represent criminal 
defendants must actually discharge their responsibilities effectively—that is, 
with professional competence and diligence—in order for the criminal justice 
system to work properly.
3
  So viewed, criminal defense attorneys are not the 
crafty individuals of the public imagination who subvert justice by getting the 
guilty off on technicalities.  Instead, they are a salutary part of a criminal 
justice system in which the search for truth, and the rule of law, critically 
depends on the vigorous adversarial testing of criminal charges. 
On the other hand, constitutional ineffectiveness doctrine treats the right 
to counsel as itself a technicality rather than a procedural safeguard to be 
taken seriously.  The lower federal courts originally refused to grant relief for 
defense attorney blunders unless the attorney‘s poor performance rendered the 
entire proceeding a ―mockery of justice.‖4  Even after endorsing the standard 
of ―reasonable competence‖ in Strickland v. Washington,5 the Supreme Court 
framed the standard in such unforgiving terms, and applied it so strictly, that 
the new standard did little to actualize—and, indeed, undermined—the ideal 
of effective representation.  For many years under Strickland, the Court 
repeatedly tolerated minimal effort and preparation by defense attorneys, 
 
2. The classic statement of this point comes from Powell v. Alabama: 
 
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill 
in the science of law. . . .  Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial 
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence 
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.  He lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect 
one.  He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him.  Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of 
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.  If that be 
true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and 
illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. 
Id. at 69. 
3. Recognizing the vital linkage between access to counsel and attorney competence, the Court 
in Powell suggested that the relevant right is the right to the effective representation of counsel, not 
simply the right to counsel.  See id. at 71 (holding that, to comport with due process, appointed 
counsel must give ―effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case‖); see also, e.g., McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (stating that ―the right to counsel is the right  to the 
effective assistance of counsel‖).  Half a century after Powell, the Supreme Court extended the right 
to effective assistance to the appellate context.  See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) 
(holding that in cases where the right to appellate counsel applies under Douglas v. California, 
attorneys must discharge their duties effectively). 
4. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 419 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1969) (describing the ―well 
established‖ rule that criminal defendants are not entitled to relief for attorney errors unless those 
errors are ―of such a nature as to render the trial a farce and a mockery of justice which shocks the 
conscience of the court‖). 
5. 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). 
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refused to hold defense attorneys to the minimum standards of conduct 
prescribed by the legal profession, and blindly deferred to strategic and 
tactical decisions by counsel.  In stark contrast to the access-to-counsel cases, 
then, the ineffectiveness cases signaled that the right to counsel is not terribly 
important after all: in the vast majority of cases, all that really matters is that 
the defendant was represented by a licensed attorney. 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court‘s recent ineffectiveness decisions have 
finally begun to take the right to counsel as seriously as the access-to-counsel 
cases would require.  In a line of recent cases, the Court has granted relief to 
several defendants whose death sentences likely resulted from attorney error.  
These cases, which have not yet gotten the attention they deserve,
6
 mark a 
dramatic shift from prior practice before and after Strickland.  Now, the Court 
no longer ignores professional standards of conduct in deciding what 
constitutes constitutionally ―effective‖ representation or tolerates minimal 
effort by counsel.  Defense attorneys must, on pains of being faulted for 
ineffective assistance, diligently investigate and defend their clients‘ cases—
in capital cases, at least. 
This Essay explores the recent shift in ineffectiveness doctrine.  Part II 
discusses the traditional, hands-off approach to regulating the effectiveness of 
defense attorneys.  As the discussion indicates, that approach is one that 
essentially replaces the right to effective representation with the considerably 
more modest right to be represented by counsel—and, in doing so, 
compromises the accuracy and reliability imperatives that undergird the 
constitutional ideal of effective representation. 
Part III canvasses recent cases that have begun to take the guarantee of 
effective representation of counsel seriously.  At a minimum, these cases 
suggest that the Court has adopted a heightened standard of attorney 
performance in capital cases, where the defendant‘s life hangs in the balance.  
The Court finally appears to have recognized that its ongoing efforts under the 
Eighth Amendment to rationalize the imposition of the death penalty will be 
futile without renewed emphasis on the quality of representation that 
defendants receive in capital cases.  Part IV contends that the more stringent 
standard of attorney effectiveness, though undoubtedly motivated by concerns 
over the administration of the death penalty, should not be limited to capital 
cases.  In this respect, ―death‖ is not ―different‖: If the legal system truly does 
value the goals of accuracy and reliability, the right to counsel should be taken 
 
6. The most extensive treatments to date are John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like 
Deja Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) 
Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127 
(2007), and Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283 
(2008). 
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seriously in all criminal proceedings, not just capital cases. 
II.  STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON AND INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE CLAIMS 
A.  The Strickland Standards (Plural) 
The governing standard for constitutional claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel comes from Strickland v. Washington.
7
  In that case, the Supreme 
Court held that defendants cannot prevail on ineffectiveness claims unless 
they prove both defective performance by their attorneys and legally 
cognizable prejudicial effect on the relevant outcome.  Attorney performance 
is not defective unless, based on what the attorney knew or should have 
known at the time, his actions were ―outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance.‖8  No matter how poor the attorney‘s performance was, 
prejudice—defined as a ―reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different‖—is required in order for a defendant to win relief.9 
Although courts and commentators frequently refer to ―the Strickland 
standard‖ in the singular, the reference is really something of a misnomer.  
The phrase is used as shorthand for the two-pronged, performance-and-
prejudice test that Strickland announced.  Unfortunately, the economy of 
words that the shorthand produces may come at the expense of a proper 
understanding of the law that Strickland announced.  In addition to being 
descriptively false,
10
 references to the performance-and-prejudice test as ―the 
Strickland standard‖ suggest that it is the performance and prejudice 
requirements that determine the vitality of ineffectiveness doctrine in 
promoting the ideal of effective representation in criminal cases.  This 
suggestion, however, is mistaken. 
The basic approach in Strickland—to restrict relief to cases where it is 
 
7. 466 U.S. 668, 690–92 (1984). 
8. Id. at 690. 
9. Id. at 694.  Several violations of the representational ideal are so inherently prejudicial that 
they are reversible even if Strickland prejudice cannot be shown.  Among these are denials of 
counsel, actual or constructive, and simultaneous representation of clients with conflicting interests.  
See id. at 692. 
10. Properly understood, Strickland contains not one standard, but several.  The first is a 
constitutional standard of performance for criminal defense attorneys (an ―objective‖ standard of 
―reasonable competence‖).  Id. at 688, 696, 714.  The second is a standard of prejudice telling courts 
when they may and may not grant relief for defective performance (reasonable likelihood that the 
outcome would have been more favorable to the defendant with effective representation).  Id. at 696.  
The third encompasses a variety of meta-rules instructing courts how they should go about deciding 
whether or not defendants have met Strickland‘s performance and prejudice standards.  Id. at 696–97.   
For example, courts must evaluate performance without hindsight and cannot find prejudice based on 
lost opportunities for jury nullification.  See id. at 689, 695. 
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reasonably likely that serious attorney error had a detrimental effect on the 
outcome—is not only sensible but entirely consistent with the ideal of 
effective representation.  Error-free trials are impossible (or virtually so), and 
accurate and reliable outcomes can be reached in spite of attorney or other 
error.
11 
 In addition, retrials are quite costly, both in terms of judicial resources 
and the strong interest in preserving the finality of criminal convictions.  
These costs should not be lightly incurred. 
Moreover, the constitutional ideal of effective representation does not 
seek to improve the quality of representation bar members provide.  That 
laudable goal, after all, is the proper concern of law schools, state bar 
authorities, and legal professional organizations such as the American Bar 
Association (ABA).  The Constitution is concerned about the level of 
competence of defense attorneys only to the extent attorney performance 
threatens the ability of the judicial system to reach accurate and reliable 
results in criminal cases.
12 
 Therefore, it makes perfect sense to condition 
relief for an ineffectiveness claim on proof that the unprofessional errors of 
the defense attorney likely had an adverse effect on the outcome. 
Of course, there is much more to Strickland than simply the performance-
and-prejudice test.  There are also meta-rules instructing lower courts about 
how to apply each prong of the test.  It is here that the true threat to the ideal 
of effective representation lies. 
 
11. This is why, for example, most constitutional criminal procedure claims are subject to 
harmless-error analysis, on both direct and collateral review, and precious few such claims (often 
collected under the heading of ―structural error‖) are reversible per se, regardless of effect on the 
proceeding.  See generally Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306–07 (1991) (distinguishing ―trial 
errors‖ that are subject to harmless-error analysis from ―structural errors‖).  Of course, because a 
showing of prejudice is necessary to establish a Strickland violation, ineffectiveness claims are not 
subject to harmless-error analysis.  The two-pronged Strickland test necessarily assumes that 
defendants are entitled to relief if it is reasonably probable that the outcome would have been more 
favorable to them had they been assisted by competent counsel.  Not only is there no hint anywhere 
in Strickland that violations of the right to the effective assistance of counsel can be disregarded as 
harmless error, but Strickland specifically states that a successful ineffectiveness claim ―requires 
showing that counsel‘s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable.‖  466 U.S. at 687.  This is the language of a ―structural defect,‖ within the meaning 
of Fulminante, that defies harmless-error analysis. 
12. As the Strickland majority noted:  
 
In giving meaning to the requirement [of effective assistance of counsel] . . . , 
we must take its purpose—to ensure a fair trial—as the guide.  The benchmark 
for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel‘s conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.   
Id. at 686.  But see id. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (―Every defendant is entitled to a trial in 
which his interests are vigorously and conscientiously advocated by an able lawyer.  A proceeding in 
which the defendant does not receive meaningful assistance in meeting the forces of the State does 
not, in my opinion, constitute due process.‖). 
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The meta-rules ensured that defense attorney actions would receive, at 
most, only minimal judicial scrutiny.  Courts were basically left without 
standards to apply in deciding whether the attorney had provided 
professionally competent representation.  Courts could not generate fixed 
constitutional rules about what attorneys should and should not do in 
particular circumstances.  Such rules would be inappropriate, in the Strickland 
majority‘s view, because criminal defense is ―art,‖ not science, and there are a 
wide variety of different approaches that defense attorneys might responsibly 
take on any set of facts.
13
  Naturally, the bar and legal professional groups 
generate standards to guide bar members, but Strickland dismissed legal 
professional standards as ―only guides‖ to determining what constitutes 
effective representation, the implication being that attorney actions that 
violate governing professional norms can nonetheless be constitutionally 
adequate.
14
 
In addition to being left without standards by which to decide whether 
attorney performance is objectively reasonable, courts were pointedly 
instructed to err on the side of rejecting Strickland claims.  In this area, said 
the Court, judicial scrutiny ―must be highly deferential,‖ particularly when 
matters of strategy and tactics are at stake.
15
  Accordingly, courts ―must 
indulge a strong presumption that counsel‘s conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance.‖16  To do otherwise and allow 
―[i]ntensive scrutiny of counsel,‖ the Court feared, would ―dampen the ardor 
and . . . independence of defense counsel‖ and ―discourage the acceptance of 
assigned cases.‖17  In combination, these meta-rules signaled that Strickland 
 
13. Id. at 681 (majority opinion); see also id. at 688 (rejecting the idea of ―a checklist for 
judicial evaluation of attorney performance‖). 
14. Id. at 688; see also id. at 693 (noting that ―an act or omission that is unprofessional in one 
case may be sound or even brilliant in another‖). 
15. Id. at 689. 
16. Id.; see also id. at 690 (―[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate 
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.‖).  
The Court added that, in reviewing the reasonableness of defense attorney actions, judges must 
―eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight‖ by evaluating those actions ―from counsel‘s 
perspective at the time.‖  Id. at 689. 
17. Id.  Although the meta-rules described in the text concerned the performance prong, 
Strickland also described a rule concerning the application of the prejudice prong:  
 
In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in the 
required prejudice, a court should presume, absent challenge to the judgment on 
grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted according to 
law.  An assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable to the 
defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, 
―nullification,‖ and the like. . . .  The assessment of prejudice . . . should not 
depend on the idiosyncracies of the particular decisionmaker, such as unusual 
propensities toward harshness or leniency.  
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claims are to be denied if there is any conceivable basis for rationalizing the 
attorney‘s actions. 
B.  The Strickland Standards, As Applied 
To see the impact of the meta-rules announced in Strickland, consider the 
facts of that case.  During a bizarre, ten-day crime spree, the defendant had 
committed multiple murders and related serious crimes.  He turned out not 
only to be a public menace, but his own worst enemy in court.  Against his 
court-appointed attorney‘s advice, the defendant pled guilty to all charges and 
waived his right to an advisory sentencing jury, opting instead to be sentenced 
by the trial judge. 
Understandably beset with a ―sense of hopelessness about the case,‖18 the 
attorney all but gave up on his client.  Even though the defendant had told the 
court that his crimes were committed under extreme mental or emotional 
distress, his attorney did not request a psychiatric evaluation, which might 
have been used to avoid a death sentence.  Instead of thoroughly investigating 
his client‘s background in search for potential character witnesses or other 
mitigating evidence, the attorney merely had a conversation with the 
defendant and two family members.  Ultimately, the attorney threw his client 
on the mercy of the court, citing the defendant‘s admission of guilt and claim 
of emotional distress.  The judge, not surprisingly, was unimpressed and 
imposed three death sentences. 
The majority‘s resolution of the case before it powerfully underscored the 
message that Strickland claims are not to be taken seriously.  Given that the 
aggravating factors were ―utterly overwhelming‖19 and no significant 
mitigation evidence was ever found, the majority could simply have rejected 
the ineffectiveness claim for lack of prejudice.  The majority, however, also 
went to great lengths to demonstrate that the lackluster effort of the defense 
attorney did not constitute defective performance.  Where the dissent saw an 
attorney giving up on his client as a lost cause,
20
 the majority saw a ―strategic 
choice‖ to ignore potential grounds for mitigation based on psychological and 
character evidence and to focus almost entirely on his client‘s acceptance of 
responsibility.
21
  To the majority, although this choice was not the product of 
 
Id. at 694–95.  A later line of cases addresses the kinds of outcome effects that do, and do not, count 
as Strickland prejudice.  Compare, e.g., Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001) (incremental 
jail time resulting from attorney error counts) with Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (loss of 
opportunity to present a perjured defense does not count). 
18. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672.  For the facts on which the following summary is based, see id. 
at 671–75. 
19. Id. at 699. 
20. See id. at 717–19 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
21. Id. at 699 (majority opinion). 
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diligent investigation into the available alternatives, it was reasonable because 
psychological and character evidence would have been ―of little help‖ if 
introduced and might have harmed the defendant‘s cause by prompting 
rebuttal from the prosecution.
22
 
Here is where the Court seriously undermined the ideal of effective 
representation.  The Court‘s application of the performance prong gave 
attorneys license to make precipitous judgments ruling out certain lines of 
defense very early in the case based on what amounts to speculation, as well 
as the ability to insulate those judgments against judicial scrutiny by uttering 
the magic words of ―strategy‖ and ―tactics.‖  Common sense suggests that 
lawyers cannot reasonably decide to pursue certain lines of defense to the 
exclusion of others unless they have first investigated the pertinent options.  
Only then will they be in a position to exercise professional judgment, and to 
make reasonable strategic or tactical choices, about whether to pursue all lines 
of defense or, if a choice is necessary, about which should and should not be 
pursued. 
The attorney in Strickland did not know—and could not possibly have 
known—what the potential psychological and character evidence was, much 
less how strong or weak it was.  After all, he did not ask for a psychological 
examination and did nothing to seek character evidence other than speak with 
the defendant‘s wife and mother.  For all the lawyer knew, there might have 
been ―smoking gun‖ evidence supporting the defense‘s claim of severe 
emotional distress and compelling character evidence showing that, apart 
from this crime spree, he was a nonviolent person.
23
 
Although the attorney could properly doubt how significant a character 
defense would be for someone accused of a spate of brutal murders, that most 
certainly was not the case for the psychological evidence.  The attorney 
actually argued emotional distress, a statutory mitigating circumstance, at the 
penalty hearing as a ground for leniency.  Having recognized the importance 
of that mitigating circumstance to the defendant‘s admittedly slim chances of 
avoiding a death sentence, any reasonable attorney would have known that, 
without testimony from a mental health professional or other evidence 
supporting the claim of severe emotional distress, the claim was sure to fail. 
Needless to say, presenting psychological evidence would have opened 
 
22. Id. 
23. As it turned out, strong psychological or character evidence in favor of the defendant was 
never found, even on postconviction review, but the lawyer had no way to know at the time whether 
or not such evidence existed.  This is significant because, under Strickland, attorney performance is 
judged ―from counsel‘s perspective at the time.‖  Id. at 689.  In any case, the failure of 
postconviction counsel to find helpful mitigation evidence does not necessarily mean that no such 
evidence could have been found with reasonable diligence.  It may simply mean that postconviction 
counsel was ineffective in his effort to prove the ineffectiveness of trial counsel.  
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the door to rebuttal, but that risk was clearly worth taking in the 
circumstances.  In the face of the overwhelming aggravating factors, it was 
very unlikely, if not impossible, that the judge would credit an emotional-
distress argument unsupported by evidence or rule out execution for a triple 
homicide simply because the defendant had admitted guilt.  Facing such long 
odds, a reasonable attorney would have thrown caution to the winds and 
aggressively sought evidence supporting the emotional-distress claim, secure 
in the knowledge that, if the evidence turned out to be weak, the attorney 
could still make the mitigation argument without offering supporting 
evidence.  If, as Strickland suggests, fear of possible rebuttal is an excuse, not 
just for not introducing evidence on a point, but also for not investigating 
what the evidence might be, then even the most inept or inattentive lawyer 
will have an ironclad response whenever challenged for ineffective assistance. 
Of course, guilt was admitted and beyond doubt in Strickland, and so the 
defense attorney‘s decisions could not have undermined the reliability of the 
guilt determination.  Nevertheless, those decisions were reasonably likely to 
have undermined the accuracy and reliability of the determination of the 
proper sentence.  Even in noncapital cases, attorney errors that result in a 
more severe sentence are proper concerns of the ineffectiveness doctrine, no 
matter how small the incremental sentence.
24
  Under Eighth Amendment 
doctrine, concerns about accuracy and reliability in sentencing are of 
heightened concern in capital cases.  The goal is to ensure that the death 
penalty is reserved, in law and in fact, for the ―worst‖ offenders and applied 
fairly, reliably, and evenhandedly.
25
 
The lax performance standards adopted in Strickland pose a serious threat 
to the Eighth Amendment‘s goal of rationalizing the imposition of the death 
penalty.  In order for capital juries to determine whether or not a defendant 
deserves death, defense attorneys must seek to humanize their client and 
develop and present grounds for showing mercy despite the seriousness of his 
crime.  If prosecutors vigorously present the case for death—and elected 
prosecutors have every reason to do so to avoid potentially stigmatizing 
defeats—a lackluster defense effort will tend to skew the life/death balance in 
favor of death.
26
  In that event, as Justice Thurgood Marshall argued in 
 
24. See, e.g., Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 200 (2001) (ruling that incremental jail 
time resulting from attorney error constitutes Strickland prejudice). 
25. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on 
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 361–403 
(1995). 
26. As I have explained elsewhere: 
 
Ordinarily, vigorous prosecution is an unmitigated good because it helps ensure 
that the truth-seeking function of criminal trials will be fulfilled.  In the context 
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Strickland, the capital sentencing decision may well turn on lapses of 
lawyering, as opposed to constitutional and statutory standards concerning 
when death is, and is not, the appropriate sanction.
27
 
The problem is deeper than simply performance standards that are too lax.  
Even in cases where defective performance can be shown, the meta-rules 
concerning prejudice make it difficult to overturn a death sentence on 
ineffectiveness grounds.  Under Strickland, ―the possibility of arbitrariness, 
whimsy, caprice, ‗nullification,‘ and the like‖ by the decision maker does not 
constitute prejudice.
28
  This makes it difficult to reverse where, as in 
Strickland itself, the aggravating factors are strong.  In those situations, it 
would seem, only a lawless sentencer could have rejected a sentence of death. 
This rule that lost opportunities for ―lawless‖ decision making cannot 
constitute Strickland prejudice makes sense at the guilt stage (where 
nullification is forbidden) and in determinate sentencing schemes (such as the 
then-mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines) that impose legally binding 
limits on sentencing discretion.  After all, in those contexts, the relevant 
decision makers are bound to follow the legal standards that govern their 
decisions.  The Strickland rule makes no sense at all, however, for the 
 
of capital sentencing hearings characterized by severe resource constraints on 
defense counsel, however, the effect is not nearly so salubrious.  Many 
resource-constrained defense attorneys (particularly those who lack extensive 
experience in capital litigation) focus their efforts on the guilt phase at the 
expense of the penalty phase.  With astonishing frequency, the result is weak or 
nonexistent mitigation cases.  For example, in the trials of forty of the 131 
prisoners Texas executed from January of 1995 to June of 2000, defense 
lawyers presented ―no evidence whatsoever or only one witness during the 
trial‘s sentencing phase.‖  Given how unlikely resource-constrained capital 
defenders are to present serious cases in mitigation, the more effort and 
resources the prosecution invests at the sentencing stage, the less likely it will 
be that the jury‘s eventual life/death decision will accurately reflect whether or 
not the defendant truly deserves to die. 
Smith, supra note 6, at 316–17 (footnotes and emphasis omitted). 
27. Justice Marshall argued:  
 
The performance of defense counsel is a crucial component of the system 
of protections designed to ensure that capital punishment is administered with 
some degree of rationality.  ―Reliability‖ in the imposition of the death sentence 
can be approximated only if the sentencer is fully informed of ―all possible 
relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must 
determine.‖  The job of amassing that information and presenting it in an 
organized and persuasive manner to the sentencer is entrusted principally to the 
defendant‘s lawyer.  The importance to the process of counsel‘s efforts, 
combined with the severity and irrevocability of the sanction at stake, require 
that the standards for determining what constitutes ―effective assistance‖ be 
applied especially stringently in capital sentencing proceedings.   
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 715–16 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal citation and footnotes omitted). 
28. Id. at 694–95, 699–700. 
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life/death decision that capital sentencers make at the penalty phase. 
Under Eighth Amendment case law, the fact finder is far more than simply 
a balancer of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  Its most important 
function, perhaps, is to serve as a dispenser of mercy—in the case of juries, to 
bring the mores of the community to bear on whether to spare the life of a 
defendant whom the law deems ―death-eligible.‖  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly ruled that a valid death penalty scheme must afford capital 
sentencers not only discretion, but unfettered discretion to impose a sentence 
other than death.
29
  As even their most trenchant critic recognizes, these rulings 
mandate that ―the sentencer must enjoy unconstrained discretion to decide 
whether any sympathetic factors bearing on the defendant or the crime indicate 
that he does not ‗deserve to be sentenced to death.‘‖30  This description implies 
that, in ―death‖ cases, defendants are entitled to seek leniency based on what 
Strickland derided as ―lawless‖ grounds, even when the law defining death-
eligibility and the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors would permit a 
reasonable jury to impose a sentence of death. 
To be consistent with the jury‘s recognized role as a dispenser of mercy in 
capital cases, the definition of Strickland prejudice should allow for the 
possibility that sentencers might choose to exercise their constitutional 
prerogative to grant mercy to defendants who otherwise could lawfully be 
sentenced to death.  The contrary definition of prejudice in Strickland fails to 
do so.  By assuming that a reasonable likelihood of a different result cannot be 
shown when the aggravating factors are strong, the definition of prejudice 
treats capital juries as simple fact finders who balance aggravating and 
mitigating factors instead of making the distinctly moral judgment of whether 
the defendant should receive mercy despite the severity of his crime.  
Strickland‘s narrow conception of the role of capital juries not only disserves 
the Eighth Amendment goal of allowing unrestricted opportunities for mercy 
in capital sentencing; it also creates perverse incentives for attorneys 
defending individuals convicted of capital crimes to ignore a core purpose of 
capital sentencing hearings—namely, to determine whether the defendant is 
morally (as well as legally) deserving of a death sentence.  In cases where the 
aggravation evidence is strong, Strickland makes it all too easy for defense 
attorneys to defend tactical choices to focus on the guilt phase to the exclusion 
of the penalty phase, or to ignore a mitigation defense in favor of other 
defenses, or to simply throw the client on the mercy of the court.   
In light of Strickland, it comes as no surprise that successful 
 
29. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 304–05 (1976). 
30. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment) (citation omitted). 
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ineffectiveness claims were rare, in capital and noncapital cases alike, over 
the ensuing decades.  As one commentator reports: ―Courts rarely reverse 
convictions for ineffective assistance of counsel, even if the defendant‘s 
lawyer was asleep, drunk, unprepared, or unknowledgeable.  In short, any 
‗lawyer with a pulse will be deemed effective.‘‖31  It is difficult to imagine an 
outcome more at odds with the ideal of effective representation in criminal 
cases and, in capital cases, with the additional constitutional imperative of 
rational and evenhanded sentencing based on individual desert. 
III.  TAKING STRICKLAND CLAIMS SERIOUSLY (IN ―DEATH‖ CASES) 
Over the last few years, Strickland claims have received a markedly 
different reception in the Supreme Court.  In 2000, the Court issued the first 
of a series of ineffective-assistance decisions that suddenly began to take 
Strickland claims—and hence the ideal of effective representation—
seriously.
32
  In each case, the defendant was sentenced to death after his 
lawyer failed to discover and present readily available evidence that would 
have constituted strong grounds for leniency.  Each time, the Court found that 
the defense attorney had rendered ineffective assistance. 
Considering the various meta-rules announced in Strickland, the safe bet 
would have been that each death sentence would be upheld.  After all, the 
defense attorneys made (or arguably made) strategic decisions not to pursue 
the lines of inquiry that would have led to helpful mitigation evidence and to 
focus on other ways to avoid a death sentence.  Without the benefit of 
hindsight, it seemed difficult for the ―highly deferential‖ review that 
Strickland mandated to result in a finding that the attorneys had rendered 
ineffective assistance, and next to impossible in light of the strict standard of 
review that governs habeas corpus actions.
33
  Nevertheless, in each case, the 
 
31. Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 (footnote omitted) (quoting Marc L. Miller, Wise 
Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 1786 (1999) (book review)).  The infamous ―sleeping lawyer‖ case 
was Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated en banc, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 
2001), in which the defendant challenged his capital conviction on the ground that his lawyer had 
slept through entire portions of the trial.  Rejecting the notion that prejudice should be presumed in 
these circumstances, the panel majority ruled that the defendant could not win without showing that 
he suffered Strickland prejudice as a result of something that happened while his attorney dozed.  Id. 
at 964.  The en banc court disagreed and ruled that prejudice should be presumed when a defense 
lawyer sleeps through substantial parts of his client‘s capital trial.  See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 
336, 349 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).  The panel decision in Burdine, though extreme, illustrates how 
dismissive many courts have been of ineffectiveness claims. 
32. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
33. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, federal courts may not grant 
habeas relief to a state prisoner unless the the state court outcome was ―contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 
the United States.‖  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).  This provision means that federal courts cannot 
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Supreme Court ruled in favor of the death row inmate, concluding that he had 
received ineffective assistance at the penalty phase.  Where it was once 
concerned about deferring to strategic choices and not restricting the 
autonomy of defense attorneys, the Court now insists that attorneys 
representing individuals charged with capital crimes must investigate 
mitigation evidence and other potential grounds for avoiding a death sentence 
with reasonable diligence and professional competence.  Thus, at least in 
death penalty cases, Strickland claims are now being taken seriously. 
A.  Mitigation Evidence: Williams v. Taylor and Wiggins v. Smith 
1.  (Terry) Williams v. Taylor 
The first of the new Strickland cases was (Terry) Williams v. Taylor.
34
  In 
that case, the defense attorney did not even begin to prepare for the penalty 
phase until a week beforehand.
35
  Not surprisingly, the defense failed to 
discover a treasure trove of mitigating evidence, including records showing 
that the defendant was borderline mentally retarded and had endured what the 
majority described as a ―nightmarish childhood‖ of severe physical abuse and 
neglect.
36
  The attorneys also failed to offer evidence from state correctional 
officers who offered to testify that the defendant would not be a danger in 
prison and failed to return the call of a prominent prison ministry volunteer 
who volunteered to testify for the defendant.  Having failed to discover any 
grounds for leniency, all the attorney could do was plead for mercy based on 
his client‘s voluntary confession.37  The jury sentenced the defendant to death. 
By a vote of 6–3, the Supreme Court overturned the sentence.  Justice 
John Paul Stevens wrote for the majority that ―trial counsel did not fulfill their 
obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant‘s 
background.‖38  In support of the notion that defense attorneys must conduct a 
background investigation in search of mitigating evidence, the Court cited 
only the ABA‘s Standards for Criminal Justice39—the kind of professional 
 
grant habeas relief based merely on a conclusion that the state court committed constitutional error.  
In order for relief to be proper, the state court‘s articulation or application of federal law has to be so 
wrong, in light of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, as to be deemed ―unreasonable.‖  
See, e.g, Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13. 
34. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).  There was a separate ruling in 2000 by the Supreme Court in another 
Virginia case involving a different petitioner named Williams.  All citations and references in this 
Essay to Williams v. Taylor concern the case involving Terry Williams. 
35. Id. at 395.  For the discussion of the facts, see id. at 367–74, 395–96. 
36. Id. at 395–96. 
37. Even then, the attorney told the jury that his client‘s decision to come forward was ―dumb‖ 
and proceeded to explore why jurors would find it very difficult to spare his client‘s life.  Id. at 369. 
38. Id. at 396. 
39. Id. 
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norms that Strickland had dismissed decades earlier as ―only guides.‖40  
Although the proper scope of investigation could be considered a matter of 
―strategy‖ entitled to substantial deference under Strickland, the Williams 
majority ruled that no deference was due to counsel‘s choice.  By their own 
admission, the reason the attorneys did not seek the records containing the 
helpful background information was that they incorrectly believed those 
records were nondiscoverable.
41
  Having failed to make a defensible strategic 
choice not to investigate mitigation evidence, the attorneys committed 
defective performance in not conducting such an investigation. 
The Court further ruled that the failure to investigate prejudiced the client 
in his effort to avoid a death sentence.  Had counsel conducted a reasonable 
investigation into mitigating evidence, they would have discovered a wealth 
of evidence about their client‘s tragic background, evidence constituting 
strong grounds for leniency.  The dissent, however, had a strong 
counterargument based on Strickland.  As in Strickland, the mitigation 
evidence would likely have made no difference in the outcome given the 
―overwhelming‖ nature of the prosecution‘s evidence that the defendant 
would be a future danger unless executed.
42
  Thus, even if the attorneys 
performed defectively by not discovering the helpful evidence, their client 
suffered no prejudice and hence could obtain no relief. 
The majority held that the strength of the aggravation evidence did not 
preclude a finding of prejudice.  Although the mitigation evidence ―may not 
have overcome a finding of future dangerousness, the graphic description of 
Williams‘s childhood, filled with abuse and privation, or the reality that he was 
‗borderline mentally retarded,‘ might well have influenced the jury‘s appraisal 
of his moral culpability.‖43  In other words, given the wide discretion that 
capital juries have to grant leniency, the helpful evidence need not ―undermine 
or rebut the prosecution‘s death-eligibility case.‖44  The defendant was 
prejudiced if, as was the case, it might have influenced the jury‘s decision that, 
as a moral matter, he deserved death.  On these grounds, the Court made 
history by invalidating a death sentence on Strickland grounds. 
2.  Wiggins v. Smith 
Three years later, the Supreme Court decided Wiggins v. Smith.
45
  In that 
 
40. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
41. Williams, 592 U.S. at 395. 
42. Id. at 418–19 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Essentially, the 
dissent‘s point was that the evidence of future dangerousness was so strong that only a lawless jury 
could have chosen a life sentence over death. 
43. Id. at 398 (majority opinion). 
44. Id. 
45. 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
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case, the public defenders representing the defendant had social services 
records indicating that their client had suffered an abusive childhood and had 
experienced serious emotional difficulties in his youth as he was shuttled 
among various foster homes.
46
  Based on their own statements at the penalty 
phase, the defense knew that these records showed that ―Kevin Wiggins has 
had a difficult life‖ and that ―[life] has not been easy for him.‖47 
Nevertheless, the defense did not follow up on the leads they had.  
Although the local practice in their jurisdiction was to request preparation of a 
―social history‖ covering the background of defendants facing the death 
penalty (which would have been prepared for the defense, free of charge, by a 
social worker), the defense did not ask for a social history—a move the state 
trial court later characterized as ―absolute error.‖48  Consequently, the defense 
went into the sentencing phase ignorant of other records documenting, in even 
more graphic detail, the defendant‘s ―excruciating life history‖ of severe 
physical and sexual abuse and privation.
49
  Counsel also failed to present the 
records they did have, or any other evidence, concerning the defendant‘s 
―difficult life.‖ Accordingly, the only arguments presented against a death 
sentence were that Wiggins was not primarily responsible for the victim‘s 
death and that Wiggins had no prior convictions, arguments the jury 
rejected.
50
 
Wiggins was a much stronger case for the prosecution than Williams on 
the performance issue.  In Williams, the defense lawyers mistakenly thought 
the documents containing mitigating evidence were not discoverable; they 
were thus unaware of the potential mitigating evidence and could do little 
more than throw their client on the mercy of the court.  In Wiggins, by 
contrast, the defense did search for mitigation evidence and had learned, at 
least in broad outlines, of a potential mitigation defense based on the 
defendant‘s background.  The failure to discover and present the detailed 
mitigation evidence found on postconviction review seemingly reflected a 
 
46. Id. at 523, 525. 
47. Id. at 515 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
48. Id. at 517, 524 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
49. Id. at 537.  The abuse included multiple episodes of sexual molestation and outright rape 
while in various foster care facilities.  Id. at 517.  It also included regular abandonment as a child, 
with no source of food for days on end other than ―beg[ging] for food‖ and ―eat[ing] paint chips and 
garbage.‖  Id. at 516–17.  See generally id. at 516–18 (discussing results of social history prepared on 
postconviction review). 
50. Id. at 515, 537.  To be fair, the defendant‘s lawyers had vigorously sought to have the 
penalty phase bifurcated so that they could lead with their preferred defenses and, in the event those 
defenses failed, fall back on a mitigation defense.  According to defense counsel, when the trial court 
denied the bifurcation motion, they decided to drop the mitigation defense rather than take the risk 
that it might detract from their arguments about the client‘s secondary role in the murder and lack of 
prior criminal record.  Id. at 515. 
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choice by counsel to focus on lines of defense they regarded as more 
promising than a mitigation defense.  The choice among potential lines of 
defense, not to mention how far to search for helpful evidence, would appear 
to be exactly what Strickland had in mind by ―strategic‖ decisions that 
receive, at most, only highly deferential review. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court again ruled for the prisoner—this time, 
by an even wider (7–2) margin.  As in Williams, the Court cited ABA 
standards requiring defense attorneys to search for mitigation evidence in 
capital cases; this time, however, the Court also looked to local practice as 
informing the ineffectiveness inquiry.  It was ―standard practice‖ in Maryland 
capital cases to have a thorough social history prepared gathering and 
synthesizing potential mitigation evidence based on the background and life 
history of the defendant.
51
  The Court saw no valid reason for counsel to have 
departed from that practice in Wiggins‘s case: counsel already had reason to 
suspect that promising mitigation evidence would be found in the client‘s 
background, and the report would have been prepared, at no cost, for the 
defense. 
The majority refused to defer to counsel‘s choice as a strategic decision 
not to expand their investigation into the defendant‘s background or request a 
social history.  Far from supplying an accurate explanation of counsel‘s 
actions, the claim of tactics was merely a ―post hoc rationalization,‖ an effort, 
in effect, to provide cover for their serious errors of judgment.
52
  As the Court 
viewed the case, counsel‘s failure to discover and present mitigation evidence 
―resulted from inattention,‖ the very antithesis of the professional judgment 
and skill that attorneys are obligated to bring to bear on behalf of their 
clients.
53
 
Significantly, the defense‘s decision could not be upheld even if viewed as 
a strategic decision.  Citing Strickland, the Court ruled that the deference due 
to strategic decisions critically depends on the degree of investigation on 
which those decisions are based: ―‗strategic choices made after less than 
complete investigation are reasonable‘ only to the extent that ‗reasonable 
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.‘  A decision 
not to investigate thus ‗must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the 
circumstances.‘‖54 
 
51. Id. at 524. 
52. Id. at 526–27.  The majority noted, for example, that although counsel claimed to have 
made the tactical decision not to present a mitigation defense, their own opening statement at the 
penalty phase belied that claim.  Id. at 526.  The defense signaled that they were going to put on a 
mitigation defense, telling the jury that ―‗Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life‘‖ and that ―‗[life] has 
not been easy for him.‘‖  Id. at 515 (citation omitted). 
53. Id. at 526. 
54. Id. at 533 (citation omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690–91 
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Here, as Maryland‘s local practice suggested, it was unreasonable to 
short-circuit the search for mitigation evidence and to forgo the social history, 
particularly given that counsel already knew, as they would tell the jury at 
sentencing, that their client had had a ―difficult life.‖  With such promising 
early returns on the mitigation issue, any reasonably competent lawyer would 
have delved deeper to get a better idea of what mitigation evidence was 
available.
55
  Absent reasonable investigation into the potential mitigation 
evidence, the majority concluded, ―counsel were not in a position to make a 
reasonable strategic choice‖ to write off a mitigation defense.56 
The issue of Strickland prejudice was more straightforward.  Although 
counsel insisted that they made a conscious decision to forgo a mitigation 
defense, the majority believed it reasonably probable that, once they had seen 
how powerful the background evidence was, even they would have introduced 
it.
57
  Had they done so, the jury might have been moved by the defendant‘s 
―excruciating life history‖ to show leniency.  Importantly, even if some jurors 
(or a majority of jurors) might nonetheless have voted for a death sentence, 
prejudice still existed.  Given the requirement under Maryland law that the 
death penalty cannot be imposed without juror unanimity, it was enough that 
―at least one juror‖ might have opted for leniency if apprised of the mitigation 
evidence.
58
 
B.  Aggravation Evidence: Rompilla v. Beard 
In the last of the trilogy of new Strickland cases, Rompilla v. Beard,
59
 the 
Supreme Court considered the duty of defense attorneys to investigate 
possible grounds for disproving or minimizing the aggravating factors 
identified by prosecutors.  The prosecution sought to prove an aggravating 
factor with testimony from someone whom the defendant had attacked 
decades earlier under allegedly similar circumstances.
60
  Nevertheless, the 
 
(1984)). 
55. Id. at 534. 
56. Id. at 536.  The majority was careful to disclaim any suggestion that defense attorneys must 
always present mitigation evidence in capital cases, leaving open the possibility that attorneys might 
reasonably elect, after due investigation, to bypass potential mitigation defenses in favor of other 
defenses.  See id. at 533. 
57. With the voluminous, and quite graphic, evidence of severe childhood abuse and mental 
deficiencies that was later discovered, a reasonable attorney would have concluded that a mitigation 
defense was not only strong but arguably stronger than the other defenses counsel presented.  
Coupled with the fact that mitigation evidence was not inconsistent with the other defenses, a 
reasonable attorney likely would have opted to present a mitigation defense alongside the other 
defenses.  Id. at 535. 
58. Id. at 537. 
59. 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
60. Id. at 383–84. 
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public defenders who represented the defendant did not even investigate the 
prior crime (which was a matter of public record open to public inspection in 
the courthouse‘s files), much less challenge the prosecution‘s account of the 
prior crime.
61
  The jury seemed to be looking for grounds on which to show 
mercy—it even cited, as a mitigating factor, the fact that the defendant had a 
young son who testified that he loved his father and would visit him in prison 
if his father‘s life was spared62—but was given nothing to counter the 
prosecution‘s aggravation evidence and no mitigation evidence of the kind 
presented in Williams and Wiggins.  The sentence was death. 
Again, the Supreme Court reversed.  Though clearly troubled by the 
various shortcuts the defense team took in the search for mitigation 
evidence—which led them to miss helpful background evidence that 
presented strong grounds for mercy—the Court did not rest its decision on the 
shortcomings of the mitigation case.  The attorneys‘ ineffectiveness lay in 
their failure to investigate the circumstances of the prior crime cited by the 
prosecutor as an aggravating factor.
63
 
Disregarding Strickland‘s mandate that attorney autonomy should not be 
restricted by hard-and-fast rules about how to represent their clients, the 
majority announced a sweeping duty to investigate in capital cases.  ―It is the 
duty of the lawyer,‖ the Court ruled, ―to conduct a prompt investigation of the 
circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant 
to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction.‖64  The 
Court grounded that unyielding duty squarely on several provisions of the 
ABA‘s Standards for Criminal Justice, essentially treating those ―guides‖ 
under Strickland, in the dissent‘s words, ―as if they were binding statutory 
text.‖65 
The majority, however, was unmoved by the criticism.  In its view, it 
―flouts prudence to deny that a defense lawyer should try to look at a file he 
knows the prosecution will cull for aggravating evidence.‖66  This is because 
defense attorneys who fail to investigate the aggravating factors on which the 
prosecution intends to rely at the penalty phase ―seriously compromis[e] their 
opportunity to respond to a case for aggravation‖ and allow prosecutors who 
are so inclined to misstate the evidence or conceal helpful evidence from the 
jury.
67
  That is why, for example, the Standards for Criminal Justice 
 
61. Id. at 384–85. 
62. Id. at 378. 
63. Id. at 383. 
64. Id. at 387 (quoting STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 4–4.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.) 
[hereinafter STANDARDS]) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
65. Id. at 400 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
66. Id. at 389 (majority opinion). 
67. Id. at 385–86. 
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admonish defense attorneys that their investigation ―should include efforts to 
secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement 
authorities.‖68 
The duty to investigate is not necessarily as sweeping as the language 
from Rompilla might suggest.  The operative test, as the Court made clear, 
remains what a ―reasonable lawyer‖ would do in a particular case.69  A lawyer 
could reasonably decide not to pursue a line of investigation that amounts to a 
fishing expedition or would be so boundless and resource-intensive as to be 
impracticable.  Consequently, the Rompilla majority cautioned that a defense 
lawyer is not required to ―look[] for a needle in a haystack, when a lawyer 
truly has reason to doubt there is any needle there,‖70 or to examine 
―warehouses of records‖ in the search for helpful evidence.71  In such 
circumstances, reasonable attorneys will necessarily limit the scope of their 
investigation. 
Nevertheless, evidence that defense attorneys know the prosecution will 
use in aggravation at the penalty phase is in a very different category.  As the 
Court declared, ―defense counsel must obtain information that the State has 
and will use against the defendant [in aggravation].‖72  This duty is so 
important to the accuracy of the adjudicative process in general, and of the 
capital sentencing process in particular, that the majority was unable to ―think 
of any situation in which defense counsel should not make some effort to 
learn the information in the possession of the prosecution and law 
enforcement authorities.‖73  Therefore, in order to render effective assistance 
at the penalty phase of a capital case, defense counsel must make reasonable 
efforts to investigate the aggravating factors cited by the prosecution and, 
more generally, to find out everything that the government knows about the 
 
68. Id. at 387 (quoting STANDARDS, supra note 64, at §§ 4–4.1) (internal quotation marks 
omitted and emphasis added). 
69. Id. at 389; see also id. at 381 (stating that attorney performance is measured against a 
―standard of reasonableness applied as if one stood in counsel‘s shoes‖). 
70. Id. at 389. 
71. Id. at 386 n.4, 389; see also id. at 382–83 (cautioning that ―the duty to investigate does not 
force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up‖). 
72. Id. at 387 (emphasis added). 
73. Id. at 387 n.6.  That was most certainly true in Rompilla, as the concurrence argued: 
 
[T]he prosecutor clearly planned to use details of the prior crime as powerful 
evidence that Rompilla was a dangerous man for whom the death penalty would 
be both appropriate punishment and a necessary means of incapacitation.  This 
was evidence the defense should have been prepared to meet: A reasonable 
defense lawyer would have attached a high importance to obtaining the record 
of the prior trial, in order to anticipate and find ways of deflecting the 
prosecutor‘s aggravation argument. 
Id. at 394 (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).  
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case. 
Even more interesting than what Rompilla had to say about the duty to 
investigate is the context in which the Court said it.  One might infer from the 
finding of defective performance in Rompilla that the defense team had 
missed available grounds for undermining the prosecutor‘s claim that the prior 
crime was an aggravating factor.  That inference, however, would be 
incorrect.  Although the defective performance in Rompilla was the failure to 
investigate the aggravating factors, the prejudice concerned missed mitigation 
evidence.  Had the defense searched the court file on the prior crime for 
grounds to counteract the prosecutor‘s aggravation evidence, the majority 
ruled, they ―would have found a range of mitigation leads that no other source 
had opened up,‖ revealing a history of severe mental illness, child abuse, and 
alcoholism
74—a theory of prejudice, as the dissent tendentiously put it, based 
on ―serendipity‖ in that by investigating the aggravation evidence the defense 
would have ―stumbled across‖ previously undiscovered mitigation evidence.75 
Rompilla is significant because it forces defense attorneys to approach 
capital sentencing hearings in the same holistic fashion that prosecutors do.  
Instead of focusing their investigative efforts just on ―their‖ part of the case 
(namely, the mitigation case), defense attorneys must investigate the entire 
case.  By pushing defense attorneys to try to learn as much as they can about 
the case as a whole (and, ideally, everything that the government knows about 
the case), the constitutional duty to render effective assistance will help ensure 
that both sides of the life/death balance jurors must strike in capital cases will 
receive meaningful adversarial testing, instead of just the mitigation side of 
the balance.  To the extent that happens, the life/death decision will be better 
informed and more likely to reflect true individual desert, as Eighth 
Amendment precedent demands, and less likely to be skewed by arbitrary 
factors such as attorney performance and resource disparities between 
prosecution and defense. 
C.  Strickland and the “Politics of Death” 
It is hardly coincidental that capital cases gave rise to the Supreme Court‘s 
new, more solicitous approach to Strickland claims.  Cases such as Williams 
v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, and Rompilla v. Beard are best understood as an 
effort to reshape ineffective-assistance doctrine in light of the deleterious 
effects of the ―politics of death‖ on the administration of the death penalty. 76  
 
74. Id. at 390 (majority opinion). 
75. Id. at 405 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
76. The following passage captures the essence of the politics of death:  
 
With the death penalty established as a highly salient political issue, politicians 
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By virtue of the politics of death, indigent capital defense is notoriously 
underfunded, both in absolute terms and in comparison to prosecutors, 
particularly in states that lead the nation in executions, such as Texas and 
Virginia.
77
  The underfunding of indigent capital defense, in turn, makes it 
exceptionally difficult for the lawyers who represent indigent capital 
defendants to conduct the exhaustive investigation necessary to discover 
helpful evidence at sentencing—which, as Williams and its progeny show, can 
mislead juries into imposing death on defendants who had strong grounds for 
leniency that the jurors never got to hear or see developed in a professionally 
competent manner.
78
  A rational, fairly applied death penalty cannot be 
attained as long as resource constraints cripple public defenders and appointed 
counsel in the effort to discover and develop evidence to counteract the 
aggravation evidence that prosecutors, with their significantly greater levels of 
funding,
79
 vigorously present in capital cases. 
 
have strong institutional incentives to make death sentences easier to achieve.  
Legislatures expand the scope of the death penalty and restrict access to the 
courts for prisoners on death row.  Most importantly, legislatures tie the hands 
of indigent defenders by denying them the funding and resources that they need, 
and that prosecutors receive, to be effective in resource-intensive capital trials.  
Prosecutors have incentives to use the death penalty as leverage to get 
defendants to plead guilty and, in cases where death will not be traded for guilty 
pleas, to win and carry out death sentences.  As resource-constrained capital 
defenders get steamrolled by prosecutors determined to win even at great cost, 
juries are given inadequate reasons for showing leniency (even when 
compelling reasons exist) and thus often respond with verdicts of death.  Try as 
they might, state judges are, in the final analysis, unable to counteract the push 
toward death, and state governors will usually have strong incentives, except in 
clear cases of actual innocence or major failures of the judicial process, to punt 
the life/death decision to the courts. 
Smith, supra note 6, at 285–86. 
77. See generally id. at 302–07 (explaining that legislatures better fund prosecutors than 
indigent defenders because doing so facilitates punishing crime, an outcome voters desire). 
78. Justice O‘Connor, who not only authored Strickland but was in the majority in Williams, 
Wiggins, and Rompilla, has openly worried that the death penalty is skewed by the poor 
representation that indigent defendants receive.  See Maria Elena Baca, O’Connor Critical of Death 
Penalty: The First Female Supreme Court Justice Spoke in Minneapolis to a Lawyers’ Group ,  
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), July 3, 2001, at A1.  In a 2001 speech to a Minnesota women‘s bar 
group, Justice O‘Connor expressed serious doubts ―about whether the death penalty is being fairly 
administered in this country.‖  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  As proof, she cited grisly 
statistics from Texas indicating that ―those who were represented by appointed defense attorneys 
were 28 percent more likely to be convicted than were those who had retained their own attorneys; if 
convicted, they also were 44 percent more likely to be sentenced to death.‖  Id.  Based on this 
phenomenon, Justice O‘Connor suggested that ―it‘s time to look at minimum standards for appointed 
counsel in death cases and adequate compensation for appointed counsel when they are used.‖  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
79. See generally Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense 
Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 394–95 (1995) (citing figures 
showing that ―[p]rosecutors receive on average more than three times the funding that is provided to 
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Seen in this light, the Supreme Court‘s renewed interest in the right to 
effective assistance of counsel in capital cases makes perfect sense.  The 
undemanding standard of effectiveness adopted in Strickland contributed to a 
death penalty that is applied haphazardly by giving the political branches carte 
blanche to use resource constraints to stack the deck against indigent 
defendants in capital sentencing hearings.  This result is ironic indeed: while 
the Court‘s Eighth Amendment cases insist that death penalty schemes be 
structured in ways that promote rationality and fairness in the application of 
the ultimate sanction,
80
 the Court‘s Sixth Amendment cases, from Strickland 
until Williams, tolerated—and, in light of death‘s politics, essentially 
guaranteed—that the goals of the Eighth Amendment cases would remain 
largely unfulfilled.  With Williams and its progeny, the Court has finally 
harmonized the two divergent strands of cases, making it more likely that 
capital sentencers will receive the information they need to make reasoned 
appraisals of whether particular defendants deserve death or leniency. 
 
defenders in the United States‖ and explaining that ―the differential is really much greater than that 
figure indicates‖). 
80. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (invalidating death penalty 
schemes that allow arbitrary imposition of death sentences as violative of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause). 
2009] TAKING STRICKLAND CLAIMS SERIOUSLY 537 
IV.  ―DEATH‖ MAY NOT BE ALL THAT ―DIFFERENT‖ AFTER ALL:  
TAKING STRICKLAND CLAIMS SERIOUSLY (IN ALL CASES) 
As previously explained, the new Strickland cases have a lot to say about 
the death penalty.  It is tempting to conclude that they speak only to capital 
cases and, consequently, have nothing at all to say about how ineffectiveness 
challenges should be treated in other cases.  There is much to be said for this 
view—after all, the Supreme Court often treats the death penalty as 
―different‖ and hence subject to more stringent safeguards,81 and attorney 
error is widely believed to be an especially serious problem in complex, 
resource- and labor-intensive capital cases.
82
  These facts, coupled with the 
Court‘s failure, to date, to apply heightened standards of effectiveness in 
noncapital cases, add up to strong grounds for concluding that the Court has 
essentially adopted a heightened standard for attorney performance that is 
reserved for capital cases only. 
Nevertheless, closer inspection reveals that there is a decent case to be 
made that the recent ineffectiveness cases should apply to all criminal 
prosecutions.  To restrict the new Strickland decisions to capital cases is to 
ignore several key changes they worked in ineffectiveness doctrine.  These 
changes take aim at the Strickland meta-rules that led courts not to take 
ineffectiveness claims seriously in the first place.  Just as these changes in 
ineffectiveness doctrine resulted in more vigorous review of attorney error in 
capital cases, so too should these changes lead courts to take Strickland claims 
more seriously in cases involving lesser sanctions. 
A.  Distinguishing Strategy from “Strategery”83 
Strickland was read for many years as creating a ―magic words‖ 
jurisprudence of sorts.  Whenever an attorney committed an error, all that 
seemed necessary was for the attorney to say ―strategy‖ and, lo and behold, 
even the most egregious and prejudicial errors could be made to vanish.  
Indeed, when attorneys failed to utter the magic word, courts were all too 
eager to supply the necessary incantation for them, upholding as strategic 
 
81. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 25, at 397–401.  For a recent critique of the death-
is-different approach, see Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of 
Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (2009). 
82. See generally Smith, supra note 6, at 302–07. 
83. See generally Wikipedia.org, Strategery, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategery (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2010).  The word ―strategery‖ was first used in a Saturday Night Live sketch aired 
October 7, 2000, satirizing the performances of Al Gore and George W. Bush, two candidates for 
President of the United States, during the first presidential debate for election year 2000.  Comedian 
Will Ferrell played Bush and used the word ―strategery‖ (a play on ―strategy‖) to satirize Bush‘s 
tendency to mispronounce words.  Id.  I use the term ―strategery‖ here to refer to litigation tactics 
that purport to be strategy, but are anything but strategic. 
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choices decisions that even the attorney involved may have attributed to 
another ground.
84
  To do otherwise was seen as inconsistent with meta-rules in 
Strickland suggesting that it is improper and beyond the judicial ken for courts 
to second-guess attorneys on matters that might reflect strategy calls. 
A key component of the new approach to ineffective-assistance claims 
after Williams v. Taylor is recognition of the overriding need to distinguish 
between ―strategery‖—attorney blunders masquerading as ―strategy‖—from 
tactical decisions that are exercises in sound professional judgment and thus 
deserving of judicial deference.  Where Strickland, as originally understood, 
made it all too easy for defense attorneys to defend errors of judgment as 
tactical moves that, as (bad) luck would have it, ended in disaster for the 
client, courts are now instructed to view self-serving invocations of ―strategy‖ 
by counsel with a jaundiced eye.  Far from requiring reflexive deference to 
claimed exercises of strategic judgment, the judicial role actually demands 
that judges carefully probe claims of ―strategy‖ for accuracy (as an account of 
counsel‘s actual thought process at the time of the challenged decision) and 
reasonableness in light of the circumstances of the case.  By smoking out 
pretextual claims of ―strategy‖ and sorting tactical decisions that are the 
product of reasonable professional judgment from those that are not, the 
objective is to ensure that judicial outcomes are not skewed by serious 
attorney error. 
Wiggins v. Smith illustrates both aspects of the current heightened scrutiny 
for claims of ―strategy.‖  After delivering an opening statement telling jurors 
that the defense would use their client‘s ―difficult life‖ as mitigation evidence 
warranting leniency, the lawyers failed to present any mitigation evidence.  
That did not stop them from claiming that they had made a strategic decision 
to rely on grounds for defense other than mitigation evidence at the penalty 
phase.  The Court rejected the strategy claim as merely a ―post hoc 
rationalization,‖ citing the defense‘s opening statement as proof that they had 
not, in fact, opted against a mitigation defense.
85
  Moreover, even though it 
might be reasonable to give up a mitigation defense in some cases (perhaps 
 
84. For example, in Strickland, the attorney admitted that it was a bout of ―hopelessness‖ about 
the client‘s fate that caused him to cut short his efforts on the client‘s behalf, a fact the dissent 
understandably stressed.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 718 (1984) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  The majority, however, refused to accept 
the attorney‘s admission and said that ―counsel made a strategic choice to argue for the extreme 
emotional distress mitigating circumstance and to rely as fully as possible on [the client‘s] 
acceptance of responsibility . . . .‖  Id. at 699 (majority opinion). 
85. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526–27 (2003); see also id. at 526 (stating that counsel‘s 
―failure to investigate thoroughly resulted from inattention, not . . . strategic judgment‖).  In Wiggins, 
the Court refused to credit the attorney‘s testimony that the defense team already knew the matters 
they were accused of not having fully investigated, testimony that struck the Court as contrary to the 
record as a whole.  Id. at 530–32. 
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even in Wiggins‘s case), the price of judicial deference to strategic choices is 
reasonable investigation of the pertinent considerations.  As the Wiggins 
majority put it, until they have conducted a reasonable investigation into the 
relevant facts and circumstances (such as the relative strength of the grounds 
for defense being surrendered and those being pursued), ―counsel [are] not in 
a position to make a reasonable strategic choice.‖86 
There is no reason to think that the Court‘s recent emphasis on the 
reviewability of strategic decisions by defense attorneys is limited to capital 
cases.  Capital cases are hardly unique in requiring defense attorneys to make 
strategic decisions.  In all but the simplest of cases, criminal defense attorneys 
are required to make a variety of strategic choices that can significantly affect 
the outcome of the case.
87
  Indeed, this is precisely why Strickland rejected a 
―checklist‖ or ―guideline‖ approach to legal representation in the first place: 
such an approach would fail to accommodate the need for attorneys, in all 
kinds of criminal cases, to make strategic decisions about how best to advance 
their clients‘ interests in particular contexts.  The need for attorneys to make 
strategy decisions, in noncapital and capital cases alike, implies a 
corresponding need for courts to scrutinize those decisions to ensure that they 
comported with professional standards of competence.  Failing such scrutiny, 
serious attorney error will potentially undermine the reliability and accuracy 
of criminal proceedings. 
B.  Holding Defense Attorneys to Professional Standards of Practice 
Strickland was long understood to mean that professional standards of 
representation are ―only guides‖ and thus not controlling for constitutional 
purposes.
88
  The obvious—and quite damaging—implication was that attorney 
conduct that falls below professional standards of representation might 
nonetheless be deemed to be ―effective‖ in the constitutional sense.  Without a 
baseline against which to measure the reasonableness of attorney conduct 
challenged as ineffective, it is little wonder that courts so readily deferred to 
the judgment of defense attorneys about how to handle their cases in the first 
two decades under Strickland. 
 
86. Id. at 536; see also id. at 522–23 (―[O]ur principal concern . . . is not whether counsel 
should have presented a mitigation case.  Rather, we focus on whether the investigation supporting 
counsel‘s decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of Wiggins‘ background was itself 
reasonable.‖). 
87. These include (1) the scope of discovery and pretrial investigation to conduct, (2) the terms 
to seek from the prosecutor during plea negotiations, (3) whether or not to advise the client to enter 
into a plea agreement, (4) the defenses and arguments that should and should not be raised (both at 
trial and sentencing), (5) whether to make objections and on what grounds, (6) the witnesses to call 
(and not to call) to testify, (7) whether (and how extensively) to cross-examine adverse witnesses, 
and (8) the evidence to offer (or not to offer) during the defense case. 
88. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
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The recent ineffectiveness cases, beginning with Williams v. Taylor, refute 
the idea that the standards of representation generated by the legal profession 
carry little, if any, weight in determining what constitutes constitutionally 
effective representation.  In each case, the Court relied heavily on professional 
standards in determining that the attorneys had rendered their clients 
ineffective assistance.
89
  With objective standards to ground the inquiry into 
the performance prong of Strickland, it makes sense that courts will find cases 
where attorneys crossed the line separating ―effective‖ from ―ineffective‖ 
representation. 
The fact that the performance inquiry is now informed, to a large extent, 
by professional standards of representation has broad implications for how 
Strickland claims are to be received in noncapital cases.  Professional 
standards, after all, do not simply speak to capital cases; they also provide 
important guidance as to how defense attorneys should represent clients in 
other criminal cases.  A prime example is the American Bar Association‘s 
influential Standards for Criminal Justice (ABA Standards), which address 
both the prosecution and defense functions.
90
 
Promulgated after ―extensive review by representatives of all segments of 
the criminal justice system,‖ including judges, prosecutors, private defense 
counsel, and public defenders, the ABA Standards reflect ―a consensus view 
of all segments of the criminal justice community about what good, 
professional practice is and should be.‖91  The standards for the defense 
function contain dozens of separate professional norms, organized in eight 
different parts, addressing in detail how defense attorneys should handle 
criminal cases.  As its drafters hoped, the ABA Standards provide ―extremely 
useful standards for consultation by lawyers and judges who want to do the 
‗right thing‘ or, as important, to avoid doing ‗the wrong thing.‘‖92 
There are, to be sure, special guidelines for capital cases, such as the 
ABA‘s Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel 
in Death Penalty Cases (ABA Guidelines).
93
  As previously noted, some of 
 
89. In Rompilla, for example, the Court repeatedly cited and quoted from the American Bar 
Association‘s Standards for Criminal Justice in its discussion of the contours of the constitutional 
duty to investigate.  See generally Blume & Neumann, supra note 6, at 152 (noting that ―Wiggins 
referenced ABA standards six times as the benchmark of appropriate attorney conduct‖ and 
―Rompilla cited to ABA standards on eight occasions as evidence that trial counsel‘s efforts were 
below the constitutional floor‖).  Wiggins likewise relied heavily on professional standards, but also 
relied on contemporary local practice in the jurisdiction where the trial occurred.  See Wiggins, 539 
U.S. at 524. 
90. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, 
at xii (3d ed. 1993). 
91. Id. at xii, xiv. 
92. Id. at xiv. 
93. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH 
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the recent ineffective-assistance cases have relied on these guidelines, as 
distinct from the generally applicable ABA Standards.  Nevertheless, it is 
significant that these cases also relied heavily on the ABA Standards, which 
apply to all criminal cases.
94
  By repeatedly relying on the ABA Standards, 
the recent Strickland cases make clear that general norms of professional 
criminal representation must be applied in evaluating attorney performance. 
In doing so, they also indicate that the new, invigorated approach to 
Strickland claims is not limited to capital cases.  If, as Wiggins and Rompilla 
show, noncapital professional norms (such as the ABA Standards) must be 
consulted in evaluating the performance of counsel in capital cases, it stands 
to reason that such norms must also be consulted in noncapital cases as well.
95
  
In both contexts, the Court—true to the original Strickland mandate that ―the 
proper measure of attorney performance‖ is ―reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms‖96—has made it clear that the effectiveness of defense 
counsel is no longer to be decided in a vacuum, without reference to the 
professional standards of representation that exist to guide attorneys in the 
performance of the criminal defense function.  Finally, after twenty-five 
years, Strickland has teeth, and courts are taking Strickland claims seriously 
in all cases: when defense attorneys prejudice their clients‘ cause by acting 
unreasonably in light of professional norms, courts will not hesitate to find a 
violation of the right to the effective representation of counsel.
97
 
This development is long overdue.  The constitutional idea of effective 
representation exists so that criminal trials will generate accurate, reliable 
outcomes.  As the Court recognized in Strickland, the lawyer‘s role in 
criminal proceedings (including capital sentencing hearings) is ―to ensure that 
 
PENALTY CASES (rev. ed. 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/ 
indigentdefense/deathpenaltyguidelines2003.pdf. 
94. See supra note 89. 
95. It is possible, of course, that in cases like Wiggins and Rompilla the Court merely seized 
upon the ABA Standards as support for reversing the death sentences before it without intending that 
those standards would apply in cases not involving the death penalty.  This account is not only 
speculative, but unconvincing as well.  In neither case were the ABA Standards the only basis on 
which to find that the lawyers had rendered ineffective assistance: in Wiggins, the defense team had 
violated clear local practice to always request a social history for a client facing a death sentence, and 
in Wiggins and Rompilla the inadequate investigation into mitigation evidence violated clear 
mandates from the ABA Guidelines.  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003); Rompilla v. 
Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005).  It simply was not the case that the Court was struggling to find a 
basis on which to reverse.  Seen in this light, the opinions in both cases should be taken at face value: 
the Court cited and applied the ABA Standards as part of its inquiry into defective performance 
because it views those standards as properly informing what constitutes ineffective assistance under 
Strickland. 
96. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (emphasis added). 
97. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 6, at 156 (reviewing data indicating a ―marked 
increase‖ in the number of successful ineffectiveness claims, in capital and noncapital cases alike, 
after Williams and its progeny). 
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the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the 
standards governing decision.‖98  Accuracy and reliability are obviously 
important concerns when the death penalty is at stake; just as obviously, 
however, those concerns are also important in criminal cases involving lesser 
punishments.  Criminal proceedings will not generate accurate, reliable 
results, or, ultimately, engender public confidence, if, as the Supreme Court 
once put it, defendants are ―left to the mercies of incompetent counsel.‖99  
That, however, is precisely what the original Strickland standards did by 
making it exceedingly difficult for defendants to obtain new trials based on 
even the most egregious attorney errors.  Now that, as a result of decisions 
like Williams v. Taylor, courts are taking Strickland claims seriously, 
ineffectiveness doctrine is, at long last, promoting, rather than undermining, 
the constitutional idea of effective representation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has come a long way since it decided Strickland v. 
Washington back in 1984.  In that case, the Court paid homage to the 
constitutional ideal of effective representation and adopted a basic 
performance-and-prejudice standard that appeared to guard against the danger 
that the outcome of criminal trials would be skewed by serious defense 
attorney error.  The appearance, however, was deceiving.  It soon became 
clear that Strickland could never meaningfully promote the goal of effective 
representation because of various meta-rules announced in the case to guide 
the evaluation of ineffectiveness claims.  These meta-rules mandated extreme 
deference to the choices of counsel that might reflect ―strategy‖ or ―tactics‖ 
and essentially blindfolded courts by requiring them to evaluate the 
performance of counsel without any authoritative judicial or professional 
standards of performance to apply.  The Strickland standards (plural)—that is, 
the performance-and-prejudice standard and the various meta-rules governing 
the application of the performance and prejudice prongs—collectively ensured 
that ineffectiveness doctrine (and, with it, the constitutional ideal of effective 
representation) would be a dead letter.  The ensuing two decades, which saw 
courts reject ineffectiveness challenges to a wide array of stunningly 
incompetent and unprofessional representation, made this reality painfully 
clear. 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has reversed course.  In a trilogy of cases 
that began with Williams v. Taylor, the Court rejected the meta-rules that had 
rendered Strickland a paper tiger.  The blindfold has been lifted, and now 
courts look closely at professional standards of representation in evaluating 
 
98. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
99. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). 
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the effectiveness of attorney performance.  Moreover, courts no longer 
respond to the ―magic words‖ of ―strategy‖ and ―tactics‖: all attorney 
decisions, whether strategic or tactical in nature, are being reviewed with a 
jaundiced eye for reasonableness in light of prevailing professional norms.  
Thus, Strickland claims are now being taken seriously. 
The result of the recently reinvigorated Strickland standards is striking.  
There has been a considerable increase in the number of successful 
ineffectiveness claims—in both federal and state court, and in capital and 
noncapital cases—since Williams was decided in 2000.100  Each year, dozens 
of defendants who, in previous decades, would have been packed off to prison 
or the death chamber despite serious attorney errors in their cases, are thus 
now receiving new trials all over the country—opportunities, in other words, 
to obtain more favorable results, either at trial or sentencing, or on appeal, 
with the constitutionally effective representation the Constitution guarantees 
every criminal defendant. 
The significance of the invigorated Strickland standards can be seen in the 
subsequent history in Williams v. Taylor.  After the Supreme Court remanded 
for a new sentencing hearing, the prosecutor, faced for the first time with the 
prospect of a mitigation defense (which was conspicuously absent in the first 
trial due to the ineffectiveness of the defense team), dropped the execution 
demand and agreed to a life sentence.
101
  One can hardly imagine a more vivid 
illustration of the value of effective assistance of counsel.  The offender and 
the crime were precisely the same at Williams‘s trial and on remand.  The 
only difference was the quality of the lawyers who represented Williams: his 
court-appointed attorneys earned him a death sentence by failing to look for 
evidence that might convince jurors that their client deserved mercy despite 
his terrible crime, whereas the lawyers who represented him on 
postconviction review did the diligent investigation that professional 
standards require and thus were able to assemble a mitigation case strong 
enough to convince the prosecutor to accept a life sentence instead of death.  
Seen in this light, Williams was really sentenced to die, not for the murder he 
committed, but rather for the ineptitude of his original attorneys, a factor that 
ought to play no part in who lives and who dies—or, for that matter, in the 
outcome of any criminal case. 
 
100. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 6, at 156. 
101. See Frank Green, Death Row Veteran’s Life Spared, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Va.), 
Nov. 15, 2000, at A1 (reporting the terms of the agreement reached with Williams on remand from 
Williams v. Taylor).  The prosecutor was not alone in his reaction to the newly discovered mitigation 
evidence: the state trial judge who presided over Williams‘s sentencing recommended that the state 
supreme court vacate the death sentence he himself had imposed after hearing, on postconviction 
review, the mitigation evidence that had not been presented at the sentencing phase.  See Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 370–71 (2000). 
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Of course, in a world of resource constraints and wealth differentials 
among defendants, it is inevitable that attorney performance will, to some 
degree, impact the outcome of criminal cases.  This fact of life does not mean, 
however, that constitutional criminal procedure should be indifferent to the 
adverse effects that resource constraints can have on the fairness and 
reliability of criminal proceedings.  Perhaps criminal procedure can help 
eliminate, or at least reduce, those effects. 
The recent ineffectiveness cases suggest that the Supreme Court is looking 
to current ineffectiveness doctrine to be part of the solution instead of part of 
the problem.  If, as is commonly supposed, ineffective representation is 
largely a function of the severe resource constraints the political process 
imposes on lawyers for indigent defendants, a toothless constitutional 
standard of effective representation—the kind of standard Strickland 
represented in its first two decades—virtually invites legislatures to continue 
underfunding indigent defense.  By contrast, a more demanding 
ineffectiveness standard can help counteract the legislative strategy of using 
resource constraints.  As long as courts stand ready and willing to set aside 
convictions and sentences where attorney error factored into the outcome, 
underfunding will no longer remain a cost-free strategy.  Underfunding may 
make it easier for prosecutors to win convictions and death sentences, but 
those fruits of their labors will be less impervious to attack on ineffectiveness 
grounds.  This, in turn, may give legislatures a much-needed incentive to 
reduce the crushing caseloads and other severe resource constraints that make 
ineffective representation so commonplace.  If that happens, then criminal 
trials will be more likely to result in the meaningful adversarial testing our 
system relies on to produce fair and accurate results, and prosecutors who win 
will do so on the right grounds—namely, the strength and justice of their 
cause—rather than the ineptitude of the defense lawyer. 
 
